
Opening a Dialogue on Negotiation and Culture: A “Believer” Considers Skeptics’ Views

Stephen Weiss

To those who believe, no explanation is necessary. To those who do not believe, no explanation is possible.
Herman Wouk, Don’t Stop the Carnival (1965)

Those who believe that culture matters in negotiation have often said that culture is to a negotiator as water is to a fish. There are parallels between these relationships. Culture, like water, is enveloping and generally taken for granted. Beyond such illustrative purposes, though, students of negotiation and culture have invoked this fish-in-water analogy as if it were proof when other scholars have questioned the importance of culture in negotiation.1 A full exchange of views, as valuable as it could be, rarely ensues.

Existing literature on “cross-cultural negotiation”2 is telling. It is replete with statements such as “human experience has shown that cultural factors affect negotiation conduct and outcomes” and “in a cross-cultural setting, because of cultural differences, negotiation becomes more difficult” (both paraphrases of actual quotes). Granted, there are a number of thoughtfully written works within this literature, including chapters of Faure and Rubin’s Culture and Negotiation (1993). Still, too many writers have relied on assertion and anecdote. Like the protagonist in the Wouk novel quoted above, these “believers” have written for other believers.

It is time to change the nature of this internal dialogue and of believers’ few exchanges with skeptics and critics. I make this recommendation as a believer myself, albeit a cautious one (Weiss 1987; 1994b). Those of us who study the negotiation-culture connection have approached it from diverse disciplinary bases and need explicit explanations in order to build and test the logic of the “culture matters” argument for ourselves and others. Moreover, after 15 years (e.g., since Harnett and Cummings 1980; Fisher 1980), work on the subject has reached a plateau. Hundreds of comparative, experimental studies
of bargaining behavior have been conducted in the US alone (e.g., Campbell et al. 1988; Chan et al. 1992; Graham et al. 1988). A wave of practitioner-oriented books appeared in the early 1990s (e.g., Acuff 1993; Moran and Stripp 1991; f Foster 1992; Salacuse 1991). Now, to advance the state of our knowledge and the quality of our advice, we need to deepen, perhaps even reorient, the search for answers.

Skeptics' views may provide the stimulus and means for doing so. For years, their perspective on culture and negotiation was not fully articulated. Business executives and diplomats provided many of these opinions, usually tersely or in fragments (e.g., Zartman and Berman 1982:10, 226-227). Recently, however, others have laid out more extensive criticisms of existing literature. They include traditionally critical scholars (e.g., Zartman 1993) and other negotiation researchers delineating roles for their latest work (Lytle et al. 1995).

This paper explores the skeptics' side of the negotiation-culture debate primarily, but not solely, for those who believe that culture matters. The three main sections of the paper sketch key features of the skeptical perspective, pinpoint issues of debate, and briefly suggest ways to enhance cross-cultural research and practice. Whether or not a full and rigorous debate opens up over culture and negotiation, this kind of foray offers some real benefits for a believer.

**Voices of the Skeptics**

In exploring cultural aspects of business negotiation in France and in the US, a French scholar discovered the potency of predispositions and attitudes on this subject. When she told French interviewees that her research concerned culture, they replied, “Fascinating.” At the mention of negotiation, however, they showed disinterest. They associated the term only with final stage deal making. In contrast, American practitioners to whom she mentioned negotiation research responded with enthusiasm, but when she said “culture,” they turned off.4

Skeptics have a range of concerns, caveats, and criticisms about the connections drawn between negotiation and culture. They may be grouped into three main categories: 1) conclusions about the effects of culture; 2) methods of argument or research; and 3) practical implications and advice. Let us consider a few examples in each category. (Skeptics' views are italicized.)

---

**On Conclusions**

(1) Believers overstate the influence of culture on process and outcome in international negotiations. For some skeptics, this stance is based on weaknesses perceived in believers' research methods (see below); others reject the "culture matters" claim in and of itself.

For example, in a letter to the editor about my article on culturally responsive strategies (Weiss 1994b), one seasoned business executive has pointed out: “Though both sides... should understand the basic ‘pattern of interaction,’ each should appreciate the other’s needs, abilities, and authority above all. Then cultural differences don’t matter” (Chai 1994:7). Some skeptics simply take the view expressed in his last sentence (which, if taken alone, would be out of context): They oppose the belief that culture has any significant impact on negotiation.

More often, though, the skeptical position seems to be that cultural factors are not the most important influences on process and outcome. As Chai asserted, other factors weigh more heavily. Similarly, The Economist (1996:26) has recently concluded:

... while culture will continue to exercise an important influence on both countries and individuals, it has not suddenly become more important than, say, governments or impersonal economic forces. Nor does it play the all-embracing role that ideology played during the cold war. Much of its influence is secondary, i.e., it comes about partly as a reaction to the “knowledge era.” And within the overall mix of what influences people’s behaviour, culture’s role may well be declining ... squeezed between the greedy expansion of government on the one side, and globalisation on the other.

In the same vein but specific to international negotiations by Americans, Fukushima (1994:7) has suggested at least three variables that may be “much more important” than cultural familiarity: the purpose and context of the negotiation; the position of the counterpart in his or her organization; and the general disposition of the counterpart to negotiating with Americans.

(2) Culture may influence some negotiations, but it does not affect certain types of negotiation. According to Elgstrom (1994:295-296), writers who have adopted this more moderate view include the following
types of negotiations as exceptions: a) complex, multilateral “modern” talks (as opposed to one-shot, bilateral ones); b) those involving parties that are very similar or well-acquainted with each other (e.g., Swedish-Norwegian as compared to Swedish-Vietnamese); and c) negotiations related to low intensity conflict or day-to-day business (as compared to essential national interests). In this vein, one might add negotiations over technical or certain commercial issues (as opposed to political or ideological ones).

Some writers have also asserted that the effects of international diplomatic (e.g., UN) or professional cultures overwhelm national and ethnic effects in negotiation (Lang 1993; Zartman and Berman 1982:226). This observation confronts claims about national culture but certainly leaves the door open for other cultural effects.

(3) Cultural descriptions of negotiating behavior (or styles) are inaccurate. In addition to problems resulting from use of these profiles (see below “On Implications and Advice”), skeptics fault their very content. For example, the national styles described in existing literature are considered too coherent, negative rather than balanced, and lacking explanations for the behavior described (Carnevale 1995:321; Zartman 1994). Ironically, some writers also find the profiles self-contradictory (Avruch and Black 1991:29). One could add mention here of conflicting empirical findings such as those on whether Japanese buyers outperform sellers in sales negotiations (Graham 1993; cf. Harnett and Cummings 1980:144).

On Methods

(4) The very target of inquiry, “culture,” is neither consistently nor adequately defined by believers. Existing cross-cultural negotiation literature has concentrated so heavily on investigating culture in terms of national groups that it appears to equate the two (see Zartman and Berman, 1982:224-229). It has also emphasized negotiating style or behavior. Yet “most experienced international practitioners,” according to Salacuse (1993:200), “know that the most difficult cultural problems are not about style ... [but are] those that center around differences in values.”

Other critics have picked up on varied uses of the term “culture” (Avruch and Black 1991:28-31; Poortings and Hendriks 1989:204, 206). In his review of cross-cultural negotiation studies, Janosik (1987) seldom found explicit definitions but he has identified four different implicit meanings or approaches. The first is “culture as learned behavior” (“what negotiators do rather than what they think”). The second, which is prevalent in attempts to explain patterns of behavior, anchors on shared values or an ideology. The third views culture as a dialectic, a relationship of tension between components. (For example, consider the title, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword [Benedict 1946], a classic study of Japanese national character.) Finally, the fourth approach, “culture-in-context,” treats culture as one of several primary causes (e.g., personality, social context) necessary to understand human behavior. (See Weiss 1993.)

(5) There are no theories or a priori hypotheses that explain how culture affects negotiation or predict why cultures differ in their negotiation processes and outcomes. A University of Illinois research team including Triandis and Carnevale (Chan et al. 1992) has boldly claimed “No theories have been used or proposed to help identify and organize how cultural differences might influence negotiation” (emphasis added). At Northwestern, a team including Brett, Lytle, and Tinsley has concurred, noting that existing literature asserts differences “without predicting why or how.” These views are consistent with criticism elsewhere that culture has been the residual category in research studies, the explanation invoked when other factors do not account for all of the variation observed (Huntington per Elgstrom 1994:294).

Specifically, Lytle (1993) has commented that believers to date have not broken culture down into meaningful components which could account for particular behaviors within a culture or for differences in certain behaviors across cultures. Further, when studies test general hypotheses which do not explicitly include cultural variables (e.g., “the seller’s profit is positively related to the buyer’s use of a problem-solving strategy”) across different cultural groups, there is little opportunity for “meaningful conclusions,” as Lytle puts it, about the role of culture in negotiation. Several researchers have also criticized existing literature for failing to articulate the type of role that culture plays vis-a-vis negotiation variables: be it main effect, mediating variable (Carnevale 1995:321), moderator (Lytle et al. 1995), or an additional and entirely different possibility, a consequence (Zartman 1993). In sum,
critics seem to argue either that connections between negotiation and culture are ambiguous or that they are incredible.  

(6) *Culture is poorly operationalized and measured.* This criticism stems from at least two common complaints. The first concerns use of general, cultural values. Tinsley and Brett (1996) have argued that a set of abstract values characterizing a group’s orientation toward life is too broad and indirect, and thus unlikely, to predict the behavior of individuals in specific circumstances. Instead, they advocate development of “domain specific” explanations.

The second complaint addresses the importation into one culture, without modification, of instruments originally developed in and for another. After administering Kilmann-Thomas’s “conflict-handling instrument” in China, Jehn and Weldon (1991) discovered that silence, while a measure of conflict avoidance in one culture, could be a natural conflict-handling response in another. Other such questionnaires and content-analytic (coding) schemes are similarly subject to threats to validity and reliability.

**On Implications and Advice**

This category of criticism represents much, if not most, of the skeptics’ concerns. Even their criticisms of believers’ conclusions about culture seem tinged by apprehensions about the practical implications. Let us consider just two criticisms, one having to do with counterpart behavior, the other with a negotiator’s own behavior.

(7) **Contrary to believers’ suggestions, cultural styles do not reliably predict or explain counterparts’ behavior.** The most extreme skeptics caution negotiators against any use or reference to counterparts’ negotiating styles or profiles.

Salacuse (1993:201) has pithily stated, “...no negotiator is a cultural robot.” This view reflects Tinsley and Brett’s (1996) observation about the poor predictability of general values and, one might add, from a statistical standpoint, of using a group average to anticipate any one individual’s negotiating behavior (Weiss 1987). It also highlights findings like those by Hartnett and Cummings (1980:168), who, after empirically studying over 200 executives from eight countries, stated: “We are generally

struck...by the overall similarity of the bargaining behaviors of the executives from the different cultures.”

Further, as many writers have pointed out (e.g., Weiss 1987), much existing knowledge is based on individuals’ and groups’ practices in intracultural negotiations. Believers have too readily assumed that these intracultural practices carry over unchanged to intercultural negotiations. (See Frances 1991.)

(8) **Too much attention to culture severely reduces a negotiator’s willingness to be creative and flexible with an individual counterpart.** To the extent that believers’ advice consists of ploys or single-tactic conventions (e.g., not exposing the soles of one’s feet in Saudi Arabia), it distracts negotiators from the sets of interconnected rules and procedures that guide interaction and develop relationships as a whole (Weiss 1987:3). At the same time, the recommendation to “do as the Romans do” in most cross-cultural writing is often neither feasible nor effective. (See Weiss 1994a.)

Other critics have suggested that focusing on culture risks the introduction of stereotypes, which introduce additional dangers and “bad habits” (e.g., Salacuse, 1993:201). Jonsson (1990:59-60) has observed that in international negotiations, as in any interaction between in-groups and out-groups, an individual tends to overestimate the homogeneity of the out-group and to prefer information that accentuates the dissimilarity of the out-group to the in-group. Moreover, because of the cognitive processes at work, an individual trying to understand why a counterpart has taken a particular action is influenced more by its “goodness of fit” with stereotypes of that counterpart than by the objective number of actors actually observed to have taken the same steps in similar situations. Stereotypes thus become self-fulfilling prophecies. In Jonsson’s words, they blind negotiators to important nuances and changes in counterparts’ behavior, and generally make international communication more difficult.

**Pinpointing Issues**

While these views are the stuff of debate over negotiation and culture, real debate—dynamic exchange—between believers and skeptics has often not gone very far. This debate is incomplete in several senses of the word. First, the central issue for the two sides, whether or not culture is signifi-
cant in negotiation, has not been convincingly settled. If believers find no explanation necessary, and skeptics would never find any explanation persuasive, trying to complete or finish the debate is pointless. Other ways in which the debate is incomplete should make us more sanguine about making some headway. For example, the debate has rarely been joined: The sides tend not to connect and compare or test their views (cf. Faure and Rubin 1993). Moreover, when exchanges do occur, believers and skeptics seem to address different points. Surely this has hampered discussion.

At least three points, or issues, need to be clarified in believers' own work as well as in any debate, or dialogue, with skeptics. These issues are: 1) different meanings and uses of the term "culture"; 2) different expectations as to the purpose and uses of cross-cultural negotiation research; and 3) different assumptions about the nature of the negotiation-culture relationship.

Meanings of "Culture"
Anthropologist Edward Hall (1981:20) once wrote, “Culture is a word with so many meanings already that one more can do it no harm.” While his premise is certainly true, his conclusion is not very palatable, especially if the intended meanings go unstated. When both sides bandy the term about as if its meaning were universally understood, they end up talking past each other. Purposes get misconstrued, and criticisms are off the mark.

One of the most significant divides for definitions of culture lies between those who see it primarily as a set of behaviors and those who focus on cognition (Janosik 1987). The latter have, among other things, treated the former as superficial and less significant. Further, the very collectivity targeted or presumed, the referent group for a culture, differs between writers. Much existing cross-cultural literature focuses on the nation, seldom noting that it represents only one type of cultural group. As a few writers have reminded us (Faure and Sjostedt 1993:5; Lang 1993:39ff; Weiss and Stripp 1985:1), most concepts of culture also apply to organizations, professions, and various other groups that develop sets of values or behavioral norms.

In short, the dialogue would be improved by clearer terms of reference, including "culture" itself. Making assumptions explicit would even benefit believers in their discussions with each other.

Purpose of Cross-Cultural Research
In an early section of his classic book *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, Howard Raiffa (1982:20-25) has described four types of negotiation research: symmetrically descriptive, symmetrically prescriptive, asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive, and externally prescriptive or descriptive. Such explicit statements have generally not characterized cross-cultural research or skeptics’ criticisms. But various purposes may be identified.

The traditional, if implicit, purposes of cross-cultural negotiation research include: describing a counterpart’s typical behavior (e.g., Graham et al. 1988), explaining misunderstanding and conflict, and predicting how a counterpart will negotiate with us (e.g., Hammer and Weaver 1994:508). Other traditional reasons for this research include understanding the role and effects of culture in negotiation and facilitating effective intercultural negotiation.

One of the clearest and most perceptive statements of purpose that I have run across appears in *Bargaining Across Borders* by negotiation consultant Dean Foster (1992). He writes:

Cross-cultural information is not about turning you into them, turning them into you, or making you more like one another. ... It is about the adjustment of expectations, about preventive versus curative action, and, ultimately, about increasing your own options.

There are other reasons as well. Among the less frequently mentioned purposes, one might list: improving understanding of one’s own culture (Hall 1981:30); discovering how others negotiate among themselves, for instance, in caucuses or in related representative-constituent discussions (Weiss 1994a); and predicting what a counterpart will negotiate about (i.e., key issues, interests). Triandis et al. (1972:35-36) have suggested a broader goal: using culture to push the limits of variation in the variables being investigated in order to establish general theories and laws about, in this case, negotiation.

By not selecting from these diverse purposes or spelling out selected purposes, believers muddle their internal discussions and allow skeptics to impute purposes and apply their own standards of assessment. Research on the negotiating behavior of a cultural group in intracultural situations which is conducted to learn about the group’s
intracultural negotiations should not be evaluated in the same way as research on the same group undertaken in order to predict their behavior in intercultural interactions. It hardly seems appropriate to fault an idea or work for not serving a function it was not intended to serve in the first place. On the other hand, how is a critic, or a believer, to know that function unless it is stated?

Assumptions about the Negotiation-Culture Relationship
Finally, the basic nature of the connection between negotiation and culture has, like other aspects of the debate, seldom been set forth and dealt with directly. Instead, implicit assumptions are more common, as indicated by skeptics' comments that culture has been treated as a residual category. But skeptics, too, hold implicit assumptions.

There seem to be three main options. One is to treat culture strictly as an independent, exogenous effect on negotiation proceedings and outcomes. Another is to consider it a dependent variable, as when a negotiator subculture is created. And still another is to see the two entangled together (e.g., Zartman (1993) on “epiphenomenal” qualities).

Other assumptions to surface and sort out deliberately include the one that culture is all-encompassing versus the one that it is “in-context” (Janosik 1987; Weiss 1993). The appropriateness of certain selections of observable variables to represent culture in empirical studies (since culture itself is a construct) also deserves attention. In addition, those who view culture as an influence on individual negotiator behavior generally seem to assume that the force or degree of influence is constant across cultures. That is, no matter what culture or collectivity is involved, a cultural group exerts the same degree of influence on individual members.

Some of these choices will be narrowed or guided by selections in definitions of culture, especially those that distinguish between behavior and cognition or values. But the assumptions here require explication and discussion. That step represents yet another way to facilitate dialogue or debate and to increase the odds that dialogue will be productive.

Improving Knowledge and Advice
At this point in the study of negotiation and culture, even skeptics seem willing to grant that culture has some effect. At the same time, even believers acknowledge that we know too little to stop exploring the connec-

tion and to rest with the conclusions already reached (Cohen 1991:153; Dupont and Faure 1991:48). It is important, in the spirit of inquiry, to move ahead, to try to learn more about when, how, and how much culture affects negotiation.

How those of us interested in the subject proceed with our work will have a major impact on the credibility and usefulness of what we find. In order also to move our knowledge beyond its current plateau, we should hear the skeptics’ voices. In the limited space below, let me mention a few final ideas about research and advice on cross-cultural negotiation.

Research
Three initiatives would improve the state of research on the cultural aspects of negotiation.

1. Ask different and better questions. As the instigators of most research, questions play a critical role in what gets looked at and how it gets studied. Yet many questions in cross-cultural negotiation research have been pulled from a-cultural research on negotiation or existing experimental negotiation games. The situation is analogous to the philosopher’s tale about the man who looked for his lost key not where he thought he dropped it, but under the street light where he could see better. For many negotiation researchers, the measurable “cultural” variables introduced by Hofstede (1980) represent such a light. Instead, we should ask questions that directly and meaningfully target aspects of the negotiation-culture relationship.

2. Study cultural factors in intergroup and intragroup negotiations. In comparison to dyadic negotiation research, there has been virtually no research into the cultural aspects of intergroup negotiations. Yet culture is an attribute of a group. Researchers could see culture in action if they investigated multiple representatives, whether in experimental or in situ settings. An added advantage of analyzing group-on-group negotiations which allow caucuses is that the same individuals would be engaged in both intracultural and intercultural behavior; their respective behaviors would be directly juxtaposed and observable (Weiss 1996:247).

3. Design more appropriate settings for experimental negotiations. The
short, one-on-one, few-issue negotiations on which many empirical results are based may not present us with true pictures of the negotiation-culture relationship. Triandis et al. (1972:36-37) have argued that such settings may be too restrictive to allow cultural factors to emerge. In the same vein, Katz (1994) discovered that stereotype bias may be situation-dependent, not constant. She compared evaluations made by individuals with little information (which typified previous research substantiating bias) with evaluations by individuals with clear, task-relevant information (as found in many business transactions). The information condition affected the presence of bias in the evaluations.

It is easy, albeit unfair, to criticize experimental settings as unrealistic. They are not supposed to be. The challenge, as Harnett and Cummings (1980:170) have pointed out, is to identify and include the most important structural and contextual factors. With respect to culture, we are still in, and should continue, the process of identifying which factors are most important.9

Advice
1. Make recommendations cautiously. Given the early and uneven state of our knowledge about negotiation and culture, we ought to be careful about our advice to practitioners. One of the most egregious errors in the literature has been assuming that negotiating behavior in intercultural contexts parallels that which may be observed in intracultural ones. Also, the common wisdom has been that negotiators should imitate or match foreign counterparts' negotiating behavior when in fact doing so is seldom feasible for negotiators (Weiss 1994a) or desired by counterparts (Frances 1991). To serve practitioners well at this stage, we should reject facile guidelines and not hesitate to draw attention to caveats (Weiss 1994b).

2. Point out the positive value as well as drawbacks of cultural differences. Much of the literature on cross-cultural interaction has focused on negatives such as miscommunication and conflict. However, there are positives. Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates (Schlender 1997) was recently quoted as saying:

   Even though 80% of what you hear from customers is the same all over the world, you always learn something that

makes doing business in each country unique, or else something else you can apply to our business elsewhere. Believe me...I wouldn't come on these trips if I didn't think I was getting something out of it...

In another light, the differences that negotiators bring to the table are the raw material of value creation. Working with and around the differences can not only expand the pie, but redefine it or create a distinctively new one.

While teaching a class for Argentines in Buenos Aires last summer, I asked pairs of individuals to negotiate the Ugli Orange role-play. In contrast to other national groups with whom I have conducted this exercise (who kept silent when they did not understand a word in role instructions), several Argentines called out to me asking the meaning of "rind" or openly consulted students in other negotiations. The foreignness of the word made it salient, and the students' willingness to pursue its meaning opened the way to realizing integrative potential in a number of their dyadic negotiations.10

Concluding Thoughts
What strikes me about the skeptics is that most of them, upon closer examination, do not deny the presence of culture or its possible effect on negotiation. They differ from believers mainly over the importance and extent of the effect. Skeptics may be convinced if arguments are carefully developed and substantiated.

In addition, believers have much to gain from the negotiation-culture debate. It has several facets and factors, ranging from definitions and purposes to alternative forms of negotiation-culture relationships. Many of these considerations may be used to improve the quality of research on cross-cultural negotiation.

In the end, what has been cast as a debate between believers and skeptics on the "culture matters" issue should probably be reframed because their underlying interests are the same. It is not about winning the debate or even about whether or not culture does matter. Ultimately, it is about better understanding and practice of negotiation, whatever its context or setting. More open and meaningful dialogue between believers and skeptics will move us toward that goal.
Notes
1. In this paper, “culture” denotes “shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize a group and orient its members’ behavior” (Faure and Sjöstedt 1993:3).
2. I use this term as it is commonly, albeit mistakenly, used, to refer to both comparative and intercultural work. As an aside, labeling negotiations “cross-cultural” seems to beg the question of the importance of culture in negotiation. The very label highlights the role of culture. On the one hand, almost all negotiation is in some sense cross-cultural. On the other hand, culture is not necessarily the most important factor in, for example, international negotiation. Note also that outside the field of negotiation, there is a substantial, long-running literature on cross-cultural negotiation in disciplines and fields such as anthropology and international relations.
3. Herein, the terms “believer” and “skeptic” are simply very broad labels for, respectively, favorable and critical perspectives and ideas. Even some of the ideas of cross-cultural negotiation researchers who have criticized their predecessors will be included among skeptical views. This paper concentrates on skeptics in the US since their views are most accessible, but theirs are certainly not the only or necessarily the most appropriate views to consider.
4. Personal communication.
5. The same methodological criticism is used by cross-cultural researchers against studies that find no connection in order to justify the researchers’ pursuit of a connection in their own studies.
6. Indeed, using cultural profiles to predict an individual counterpart’s behavior borders on an ecological fallacy. Given their grounding, cultural profiles seem most appropriate to use in predicting a counterpart team’s behavior in any one negotiation or the common behavior of several individuals over many negotiations. The usefulness of a profile for predicting one individual’s behavior may depend largely on how much or little variation a cultural group tolerates in its individual members’ conduct.
7. For hostage negotiations, Hammer and Weaver (1994:508) have written: “A psychological profile is quite useful when it enables a negotiator to anticipate the behavior of a hostage taker and to identify those tactics that would most likely motivate the hostage taker to release the hostages and give him/herself up....To...assume that all hostage takers perceive, think,


Negotiation and Culture: A "Believer" Considers Skeptics' Views


