

Negotiators' Effectiveness with Mixed Agendas: An Empirical Exploration of Tasks, Decisions and Performance Criteria

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Abstract This article analyzes the performance of 1,060 individuals in dyadic, mixed-agenda negotiations in order to further understanding of individual negotiators' effectiveness and test the applicability of common negotiation advice. To evaluate performance, both established and new measures were employed. In general, individuals were not effective, although there was wide variation that included highly effective negotiators. In striking contrast to previous research, high-performing individuals' achievements were not significantly related to maximum joint value creation or to maximum logrolling. Most of the variation in benchmarked (best-practices) effectiveness and in partner-compared effectiveness was explained by individuals' decisions on three types of agenda items: pure conflict, reverse priorities, and no-conflict. Each had a significant effect (with one exception), but decisions on pure conflict influenced individual effectiveness much more than decisions on either of the other two. Additional results include the extent to which negotiators tended to compromise, logroll, agree on common values, and modify their decisions across items within an item type. Among other implications, these findings argue for richer, more nuanced treatment of individual effectiveness and for advice that is attentive to the structural features of particular negotiations.

Keywords Negotiation · Effectiveness · Multi-issue · Mixed motive · Distributive · Integrative · Logrolling · Common value · Decision-making

Much negotiation research has been motivated by the quest to explain and enhance negotiators' effectiveness (Rubin and Brown 1975; Thompson 2006, 2). Numerous

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experiments have shown that individuals typically “suboptimize” in their decision-making as negotiators (Moran and Ritov 2007; Neale and Bazerman 1991, 61). The most common explanation in literature today is that they miss potential joint gains and “leave money on the table” (Thompson 2006, 2). To realize those gains and reach “optimal” outcomes, negotiators have been widely advised to adopt integrative bargaining (Henderson et al. 2006, 712). Yet it seems that there should be more to this story.

Our empirical knowledge of negotiators’ decision-making behavior is largely based on simple tasks. The classic bilateral monopoly game (Gauvin et al. 1990; Siegel and Fouraker 1960) entails negotiation over one issue: price. The “Kelley game” (Kelley 1966) and its variants center on three issues: prices for three products (e.g., Pruitt 1981, 164; Tutzauer 1990). These games may not, however, elicit the kind of behavior manifest in more complex negotiations. In fact, even in going from one to three issues, Kelley game research has demonstrated that the very structure of bilateral monopoly precludes some forms of bargaining behavior. So we might well raise questions about decision-making in negotiations over more than three issues.

Many real negotiations concern not only multiple issues, but different types. Sales and procurement professionals often distinguish between price, product specifications, and terms and conditions. In collective bargaining, parties refer to “economic” and “non-economic” issues. Elsewhere, veteran negotiators recommend sorting out issues and “non-issues” (U.S. Department of Defense 2008). These are not just “multi-issue” negotiations in the literal sense of the word, but negotiations over what Walton and McKersie (1965) originally called different types of “agenda items”—or for short, “mixed agendas.”

Individual behavior and effectiveness in these rich decision-making situations deserve more investigation than they have received to date (e.g., Balakrishnan et al. 1993; Curhan and Overbeck 2008; Murnighan et al. 1999). Attention may be directed to the three fundamental questions implicit in the opening paragraph. First, how effectively do individuals perform with mixed agendas? For that matter, what criteria or standards should be used for these assessments? Second, what explains individuals’ effectiveness (or lack thereof)? Do they make better decisions about some agenda items than they do about others? And third, how might individuals improve their effectiveness?

To answer these questions, this article draws on data from 1,060 participants in an eight-item, two-person (dyadic) negotiation exercise that is relatively new to research literature. The analysis produced surprising as well as anticipated results. Performance gaps did exist, and logrolling, a form of integrative bargaining, was uncommon. Yet individuals’ effectiveness was *not* strongly related to logrolling or to high joint gains, and decisions on “distributive” agenda items influenced effectiveness much more than integrative decisions did. Moreover, negotiators made different types of decisions— not always the same type—on different agenda items. These findings, among others, call for more refined consideration of the effectiveness of individual negotiators, highlight the influence of task structure on negotiator decision-making, and challenge the potency of negotiation advice that is singular and uniform rather than contingent upon the task or situation.

1 Review of Literature

Three areas of previous research informed analysis and discussion for this paper: evaluation of negotiator effectiveness, negotiation issues and agendas, and decision-making behavior in multi-issue negotiations.

1.1 Evaluation of Negotiator Effectiveness

Experimental studies on negotiation have measured negotiator effectiveness in various ways. At the interaction or group level, they include attainment of agreement, impasse rates (Weingart et al. 1993), comprehensiveness of an agreement, and duration of proceedings. For the most part, joint performance has been evaluated in terms of total gain—sometimes labeled “integrativeness” (Tutzauer 1990; Wolfe and McGinn 2005)—and Pareto optimality (Moran and Ritov 2007), a state in which the outcome cannot be improved for one negotiator without negatively affecting the other. At the level of the individual negotiator, effectiveness measures include the negotiator’s own tangible gain or reward, satisfaction with the outcome, achievement of pre-negotiation goals, gain relative to the counterpart (e.g., Curhan and Overbeck 2008), and the counterpart’s satisfaction with the outcome (Graham et al. 1994). Many—perhaps most—studies since the 1980s have incorporated a measure of individual gain and a measure of total or joint gain (for a dissenting view, see Graham et al. 1988, 49). But the lion’s share of recent attention has gone to joint measures of effectiveness.

In the early days of negotiation research, Rubin and Brown (1975, 33) wisely forewarned, “...determination of bargaining effectiveness becomes a complex task ...effectiveness may be gauged from a variety of perspectives.” Thompson (1990b) has distinguished economic (“objective”) and socio-psychological (perceptual) measures, associating the former with rational decision-making (specifically, utility and decision theories) and the latter with theories of social perception and social judgment. Other conceivable perspectives are based on justice theory and motivational orientations (Rubin and Brown 1975, 198ff).¹ It is no wonder that for the evaluation of an individual negotiator’s effectiveness—the focus of this study—there is no single, universally accepted standard that may simply be adopted.

Few researchers have actually defined “bargaining effectiveness” explicitly or beyond a particular operationalization. In one exception, Ghosh (1994, 264) has stated that it is “...the extent to which a negotiator achieves his or her desired outcome from a bargaining process.” This definition prompts three important considerations.

The first is the quality of effectiveness as a variable. The definition above assumes a continuous quality; negotiators achieve degrees of effectiveness. This view certainly suits much statistically oriented research. On the other hand, effectiveness could be treated discretely with the aim of delineating effective from ineffective negotiators. That would require a threshold or dividing line of some sort.

Second, the definition distinguishes ends from means, or product from process, and hints at evaluating a negotiator’s final achievement apart from his or her negotiating

¹ For a comprehensive discussion of effectiveness in another context, see Lewin and Minton (1986).

style. A lot of literature on negotiation combines the two, using attributes of integrative bargaining to assess results. In contrast, Williams (1983) reported that practicing lawyers viewed both competitive and cooperative peers as effective negotiators (though the latter outnumbered the former). It may be useful on a conceptual level, especially with respect to complex mixed-agenda negotiations, not to limit the evaluation of general negotiation effectiveness a priori to a standard based on a single process or style.

Third and lastly, Ghosh's (1994) definition turns the spotlight on the negotiator as the source for evaluation criteria: "*his or her* desired outcome." An obvious alternative is an outside observer or set of external standards. Clyman and Tripp (2000) have persuasively argued that misalignment between internal and external standards can easily occur in negotiation experiments and in-class exercises where participants are assigned roles and goals. When "discrepant values" occur, the authors argue, they undermine the observer's conclusions (see also Vetschera 2006). That depends on the subject of study, however, and even granting their point, there is still a place for external standards and a long tradition of research based on them. Even Clyman and Tripp (2000) advise vigilance, not discontinuation, and recommend remedies such as multiple measures of performance and tests of their relationships (see Tripp and Sondak 1992).

In sum, this review underscored the potential usefulness of discrete and continuous variables and of considering individual effectiveness from more than one perspective or performance criterion. New criteria might enrich analysis, especially for mixed-agenda negotiation. For my study, I planned to employ several measures of effectiveness.

1.2 Issues and Agendas

The "issue components" of bargaining structure are "likely to exert *profound* influence on bargaining effectiveness" [emphasis added]. So wrote Rubin and Brown (1975, 127–156), who went on to point out factors such as the number of issues, presentation, tangibility, prominence, and reward structure. Since that observation, conceptual work on multi-issue negotiations has included Putnam and Holmer's (1992) discussion of issue development, Balakrishnan et al. (1993) model for agenda-setting, and Sebenius's (1983) cautions about adding issues to an agenda. Empirical study of issue treatment has been pursued in both two-person (e.g., Naquin 2003) and group negotiations (Weingart et al. 1993; Olekalns et al. 2003).

In much of this research, the term "issue" has been used to denote *any* "topic under discussion in negotiation" (Pruitt 1981, 10). In its original sense, however, the term specifically meant a subject of conflict or controversy (Diehl 1992, 333), and not all topics in negotiation, as we shall see, entail conflict. Using "issue" loosely can be confusing. Without venturing into what constitutes conflict (Deutsch 1973, 6) or whose perceptions matter, I prefer, for analytical precision and clarity, Walton and McKersie's (1965, 13) more neutral, if cumbersome, term "agenda item." The agenda per se may be thought of as the substantive domain and order of topics in negotiation (Balakrishnan et al. 1993).

As the number of agenda items increases (consider the move from single to multi-issue negotiations) [Rubin and Brown \(1975, 147\)](#) postulated that the pressure to differentiate among items grows. Over the years, three main types of agenda items have been identified. Two go back to [Walton and McKersie's \(1965, 5, 127\)](#) original distinction between “issues” (which they defined as agenda items where “the interests of the two parties are diametrically opposed”) and “problems” (where interests are “identical or completely coincidental”). The two authors asserted that these were pure types, whereas “mixed items,” which have issue and problem aspects, were more common. Research since then has not concentrated on these mixed items, but on so-called “distributive” and “integrative” issues. The former typically refer to the apportionment of a fixed quantity or value, while the latter hold “integrative potential” that allows for tradeoffs across two or more items of different priority for negotiators. The third type of “issue” in the literature, rather neglected by comparison to the other two, has been called “compatible” ([Pinkley et al. 1994, 105](#)) or “common value” since “both parties want the same thing ...” ([O'Connor and Carnevale 1997](#)).

[Walton and McKersie \(1965, 127\)](#) carefully distinguished between the subject matter of negotiation—issues and problems—and the systems of activities by which negotiators handle them (distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, etc.). They did not assume that negotiators' behavior would always match the interests or payoffs associated with an agenda item or that a particular topic or task would always elicit the same behavior from negotiators.

For similar reasons, I prefer to depart from current practice and designate the three types of topics as “pure conflict items” (i.e., “issues”), “reverse (high-low) priority items,” and “no-conflict items.”² Agenda items may undergo transformation during negotiation (see [Curhan et al. 2004](#); [Putnam 1994](#)), but that possibility goes beyond the scope of this study and much experimental research. The focus here is the different types of agenda items and negotiators' decisions on them.

1.3 Decision-Making in Multi-Issue Negotiations

Finally in this review, existing empirical research on “multi-issue” negotiations (i.e., three or more issues of at least two types) has already shed some light on individuals' effectiveness. Assessing studies of two-person negotiations—the type most relevant to my study—is not entirely straightforward, however. Many of them entail experimental manipulations that preclude or obscure baseline readings of negotiator effectiveness. They also rely on different measures of effectiveness. For convenience, I have, where possible, converted negotiators' results below to the same performance measure: achieved percentage of the theoretical maximum.

In *Kelley games*, [Graham et al. \(1988\)](#) found that American negotiators achieved a mean individual profit of 81% of the maximum possible and mean partner satisfaction of 75%. In an open market for three-issue deals [Moran and Ritov \(2007, 82\)](#) saw most

² In [Walton and McKersie \(1965\)](#) view, common-value and reverse-priority items are both subsumed under “problem.” Also, integrative potential is defined broadly as solutions in which one negotiator's gains do not represent equal sacrifices by the other (p. 5). For more, see [Ikle \(1976, 2–3\)](#) on conflicting interests as “issues of conflict” and common interests of two types: identical, and complementary.

participants (73%) reach at least one “optimal” agreement (defined as maximum joint profit), although only 36% of all agreements were optimal. In a modified Towers Market exercise with two distributive and two integrative items, 11% of the negotiating dyads achieved Pareto efficiency scores of 100% (Weingart et al. 1996). The mean efficiency score was 84%.

The negotiation task most similar to the one chosen for this study (see Fulmer et al. 2008; Ma 2007) is the extensively analyzed, eight-item, New Recruit game. Its agenda consists of two pure conflict, four reverse-priority, and two no-conflict items. In one study, Pinkley et al. (1994) observed that the highest performing individuals, who had been assigned high non-settlement alternatives, averaged only 44% of their maximum possible role scores; 21% of them agreed to terms worth even less than their non-settlement alternatives. When Wolfe and McGinn (2005) reduced the original agenda to one conflict and four reverse-priority items, they saw individuals achieve 57% of their individual maxima, on average, while dyads achieved 91% of a fully integrative agreement (the maximum sum of individual payoffs). Additional research on various versions of this game continues to be published (Curhan and Overbeck 2008).

At this stage, we do not have sufficient grounds to generalize with confidence from these results. Comparisons across different games is troublesome—and sometimes misleading—since the tasks vary in difficulty. Different experimental manipulations (e.g., Pinkley et al. 1994) and effectiveness measures (e.g., Weingart et al. 1996 versus Moran and Ritov 2007) further complicate attempts to assimilate assessments of individual effectiveness. Finally, much “multi-issue” research seems to rest on largely distributive, largely integrative, or reduced item agendas, including single examples of an item type (Barry and Friedman 1998; Galinsky et al. 2002). That simplifies analysis, but it also modifies the negotiator’s task, minimizes interplay within and across item types and veers from a truly mixed agenda.

Several explanations for performance gaps and suboptimal effectiveness appear in this literature. As in simpler negotiations, multi-issue negotiators have been observed not integrating—or logrolling—reverse-priority items. Logrolling, as Henderson et al. (2006) put it, involves conceding on low-priority issues in exchange for concessions on high-priority issues (also Tajima and Fraser 2001). In a study by Murnighan et al. (1999), only 34% of all dyads logrolled to the maximum extent possible (cf. Weingart et al. 1996). Negotiators tend not to make these decisions because they handle agenda items one at a time (Henderson et al. 2006). The most common decision for negotiators on any agenda item in Murnighan et al.’s (1999) study, which included two conflict, two reverse-priority and two no-conflict items, was simply to divide gains equally. With respect to no-conflict items specifically, Thompson et al. (1990a) discovered in another study that only 23% of the negotiators realized that the agenda contained common values, even though most dyads managed to agree on optimal solutions for these items.³

Thirty years after Walton and McKersie’s (1965) assertion that different agenda items are best handled differently, Fells (1998, 319) concluded, “mixed bargaining

³ Besides agenda items, other investigated factors include information (Murnighan et al. 1999; Tutzauer 1990; Weingart et al. 1996), power (Pinkley et al. 1994; Wolfe and McGinn 2005), and experience (Moran and Ritov 2007; Thompson et al. 1990a).

is not presented as an option in the prescriptive literature, nor has it been the subject of much research.” Along the same lines, O’Connor and Carnevale (1997, 514) emphasized the importance of studying *multiple* examples of different agenda items. Interest in multi-issue negotiation has increased over the last 10 years (e.g., Olekalns et al. 2003), but Fells’ statement still speaks to a significant bias and the need for more mixed-agenda research.

2 Hypotheses

This study centered on four hypotheses about negotiators in mixed-agenda negotiations.

H1 In mixed-agenda negotiations, individuals tend not to be effective negotiators.

If negotiators are generally not effective in simple negotiations, then they can be expected to perform at least as poorly, if not worse, in more complicated negotiations. Existing studies on multi-issue negotiations support this expectation, although their standards for effectiveness differ. This hypothesis presented an opportunity to develop definitions for individual effectiveness, measure it in a new context, and compare results to those from other mixed-agenda negotiations (e.g., New Recruit).

H2 The ineffectiveness (effectiveness) of individual negotiators is related to their failure to create (their creation of) maximum possible joint (total) value.

As noted earlier, the most common explanation for underperformance in negotiation literature is missed joint gains. They may be envisioned as a portion of the agenda or across the agenda as a whole. Hypothesis 2 (H2) takes up the latter. It corresponds with “expanding the pie” (Lum et al. 2002; Pruitt 1981, 156), one of the most widely recommended forms of integrative behavior (Bazerman and Neale 1992; Fisher and Ury 1981; Lax and Sebenius 2006, 126). This hypothesis connected individual and dyadic effectiveness.

H3 The ineffectiveness (effectiveness) of individual negotiators is related to decisions not to (decisions to) logroll to the maximum extent possible.

In contrast to H2’s global emphasis, H3 targets reverse-priority items in an agenda and a second form of integrative decision-making: logrolling. In various negotiation games, logrolling has been associated with reaching optimal negotiation outcomes (Henderson et al. 2006, 712). At the same time, negotiators typically do *not* logroll as much as possible (Murnighan et al. 1999). This hypothesis was set up to examine this generally acclaimed form of decision-making and its impact on overall performance with a mixed agenda.

H4 In mixed-agenda negotiations, the effectiveness of individual negotiators is related to differentiated decision-making for different types of agenda items.

This last hypothesis addresses the variety of items in a mixed agenda and goes beyond a single type of decision-making. Walton and McKersie (1965, 128ff) asserted

that issues lead to compromises, problems result in integrative solutions “in some degree,” and mixed items induce one or the other. In a similar vein, after surveying American attorneys, [Schneider \(2002, 197\)](#) concluded that effective negotiators balance empathy and enlarging the pie with assertiveness and arguing well for clients (see also [Allred 2000](#); [Shell 1999, 238–242](#)). Thus for H4, effective negotiators were expected to make different types of decisions on different types of agenda items. This hypothesis required investigation of the types of decisions that negotiators make and the impact of those decisions on effectiveness. It was thereby intended to add much more to the current story about individual effectiveness in mixed-agenda negotiations.

3 Methods

To test these hypotheses, I adopted an exploratory, ex-post approach to a large corpus of negotiation role-play results. As in [Filzmoser and Vetschera’s \(2008\)](#) study, these negotiations were not conducted under strictly controlled experimental conditions, but the volume of data, as they noted, partially offsets that drawback. There is a long-standing tradition of research based on negotiation role-plays conducted in the context of a course. One could even suggest that participants’ behavior may have been more natural in this situation than it would have been in a laboratory setting.

3.1 Participants

All students in a required first-year MBA course on management skills at a North American business school participated in a negotiation role-play to fulfill an assignment for one class devoted to negotiation. In total, 1,102 students participated over a 5-year period (2003–2007). Demographic information was not solicited directly, but the school’s admissions profile for the class of 2007 describes the entire sample. The class averaged 29 years of age, 6.5 years of work experience, and a male-to-female ratio of 63:37, with 57% of the students who had only one citizenship holding it for a country outside the school’s home base (Canada).

Students from each year were divided into multiple sections for the course. To justify the pooling of data, I compared means for individual negotiator effectiveness between years and between sections within a given year. No significant differences at the .05 level resulted from ANOVA (e.g., for years, $F(4,525) = 1.96$) or *t*-tests.

3.2 Negotiation Task

This two-person scorable negotiation involves the finalization of a contract between a book publisher, BestBooks (BB), and the agent for a well-known writer, Paige Turner (PTA). There are eight agenda items: royalty rate, contract signing bonus, weeks for the book to remain in press, weeks for the author to promote the book, contract duration, the number of contract renewals at the publisher’s option, countries in which to sell the book, and the number of book clubs to adopt the book. (For case materials, see [Lewicki et al. 1993, 597ff.](#))

Role material for each negotiator briefly describes the situation and agenda items, and enumerates five possible solutions for each agenda item. The order of items and solutions is identical for both roles. Solution values range from 0 to 7,500 points, although only 1 of the 40 listed solutions for each role is worth 0 points. (For details, see Appendix.) The maximum score for each role is 32,500 points. Consistent with most role-plays of this kind, the material instructs each participant not to reveal any point values during negotiation and to “obtain the highest possible score.” No reservation prices or alternatives to agreement were specified in the instructions. Between the two negotiators, there are 390,625 conceivable eight-item agreements.

While the eight agenda items are not categorized (or numbered) in the role material, they represent three types of items: pure conflict (Items 1, 2 and 6), reverse priorities (Items 4 and 5), and no conflict (Items 3, 7 and 8). (See illustrations in Fig. 1a–c.) The pure conflict set consists of two zero-sum items and one nonzero-sum item (more on its inclusion below), and the no-conflict items include two with equal gains for the negotiators and one with unequal gains. (See Appendix.) For the rest of this article, the term “conflict items”—as opposed to “pure conflict items”—refers to Items 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 (all but the no-conflict items).

3.3 Procedure

Most participants conducted the negotiations as an ungraded, pre-class assignment. Negotiation partners were assigned by teaching assistants who directed participants to follow the written instructions, negotiate a comprehensive agreement within 30 min, and submit their agreed solutions in writing. Although the out-of-class protocol prevented any monitoring of compliance, point disclosure was not expected because rules were explicit and the participants, mature. In fact, prior to 2005, students negotiated in class, and their results, which account for 19% of the total sample, did not differ significantly at the .05 level from students who negotiated before class ($t(135) = -1.68$).

3.4 Data Sets

Only complete, eight-solution agreements were used to build data sets. No-agreement outcomes were not systematically logged (cf. Tripp and Sondak 1992), but few occurred. (For similar results, see Fulmer et al. 2008.) Of 548 dyadic agreements, I excluded 18. Six involved two-on-one negotiations (due to odd-number class enrollments), 9 contained solutions not specified in role materials, and 3 were duplicate records. That left 530 dyads—1,060 individuals—for further data development and analysis.

3.5 Measures

In hopes of new insights and robust conclusions, I chose several measures for individual negotiators’ effectiveness and decisions. The effectiveness variables measure tangible gains; subjective data were not available. Some of the variables follow or extend current practice while others are new conceptualizations.




Fig. 1 Payoff structures for different agenda items

Negotiator effectiveness. The first criterion that I considered was the theoretical role point maximum illustrated in the literature review above. Then I added four criteria representing other orientations and concerns. The shorthand labels for the five measures of effectiveness are: “overall,” “high-level,” “benchmarked,” “value-adding,” and “partner-compared.”

Table 1 Measures of negotiator effectiveness

Label	Definition	Theoretical range of values for 8-item agreements in BB-PTA	
		Minimum	Maximum
<i>For Individuals</i>			
Overall	Percentage of theoretical maximum point total for a role	BB = +24.9 PTA = +24.9	BB = +100 PTA = +100
High-level	Attainment (or not) of ≥ 90 on overall effectiveness scale	0 or 1	
Benchmarked	Percentage achieved of point total associated with agreement based on symmetric, best practices	BB = -69 PTA = -68	BB = +25 PTA = +29
Value-adding	Percentage achieved of the points that lie above an “easy money” baseline	BB = -69 PTA = -49	BB = +100 PTA = +100
Partner-compared	Difference between negotiator and counterpart’s achieved percentages of their respective maxima for conflict items	BB = -82 (5 items) PTA = -82 (5 items)	BB = +82 (5 items) PTA = +82 (5 items)
<i>For Dyads</i>			
Overall	Percentage of theoretical maximum point total for a dyad	59	100
High-level	Attainment (or not) of ≥ 90 on overall effectiveness scale	0 or 1	
Pareto optimal	An agreement whose benefits for one negotiator cannot be improved without decreasing the counterpart’s benefits	45 unique pairs of BB and PTA scores (via 93 comprehensive agreements)	

Overall effectiveness captures the percentage of total possible role points achieved by a negotiator (cf. Murnighan et al. 1999). This measure is consistent with instructions to: “...obtain the highest possible score.” For the BB-PTA negotiation, overall effectiveness equals: (individual points earned/32,500)*100. It is a continuous measure of effectiveness, although if only eight-item agreements are considered, the scale begins at 25 (what each player receives for the worst eight-item configuration) (See Table 1). There is no built-in demarcation between “effective” and “ineffective”—except, implicitly, at the very top. (Some observers might deem 100 to be “optimal.”)

To facilitate identification of effective and ineffective negotiators, I selected the 90 level on the overall scale as the threshold for effective, high-level performance. This level represents the “Grade A” standard, a common North American view of quality or effectiveness that would be familiar to negotiators and observers. (Any concerns about cultural bias or arbitrariness could later be addressed through sensitivity tests.) BB and PTA negotiators who met this minimum qualification could be labeled “high-level” or “high” performers (cf. O’Connor and Carnevale 1997). The dichotomous quality of this variable offered some unique advantages for analysis.

Benchmarked performance shifts focus from theoretical point maxima to the content of an agreement—in particular, one based on current “best practices.” Delving into the specifics of the BB-PTA task and reward structure and assuming a symmetric, reasonable—as compared to an omniscient, rational—view for both negotiators (Raiffa et al. 2002, 86), I compiled an eight-item agreement consisting of maximum logrolling on items with reverse priorities, maximum common-value solutions on no-conflict items, and the middle-listed solutions—a salient form of compromise—on pure conflict items. This configuration awards 26,100 points to BB (80.3 on overall effectiveness) and 25,100 (77.2) to PTA. Note that there are many paths to these levels and that the levels are neither Pareto optimal nor joint maximizing. (That would have required a different derivation.) Individuals who did not achieve these benchmarks could be considered “ineffective.” This measure was also designed to express the degree to which negotiators missed or exceeded benchmarks. The formulas are: for BB, $[(\text{own points earned} - 26,100)/26,100] * 100$; and for PTA, $[(\text{own points earned} - 25,100)/25,100] * 100$.

The value-adding measure came from the realization that some gains in the above measures could be achieved, essentially, by “free-riding” more than deliberately negotiating on one’s own behalf. In the BB-PTA exercise, a negotiator can obtain roughly half of his or her point maximum just by acceding to the counterpart’s every wish. These “easy-money” baselines are 18,100 points (55.7 on overall effectiveness) for BB and 16,100 points (49.5) for PTA. Value-adding effectiveness sets these amounts aside and aims at how much negotiators achieve above the baselines. It was calculated for BB and PTA, respectively, as: $[(\text{own points earned} - 18,100)/(32,500 - 18,100)] * 100$ and $[(\text{own points earned} - 16,100)/(32,500 - 16,100)] * 100$.

Finally for individual measures, partner-compared effectiveness taps into a comparison often made by negotiators themselves: their gains versus their counterparts’ (Ghosh 1994, 277). This measure makes sense only for agenda items involving some conflict. For the BB-PTA context, the measure incorporates the five conflict items and compares the two negotiators’ value-claiming achievements as percentages of their respective point maxima for those items. The maximum is 17,500 points for BB and 20,000 for PTA. Partner-compared effectiveness was computed as: $[(\text{own score } 5/\text{own maximum } 5) - (\text{counterpart score } 5/\text{counterpart maximum } 5)] * 100$. With this measure, assessing whether or not a negotiator is effective, and by how much, requires additional criteria and varies by perspective. From a competitive point of view, an effective (ineffective) negotiator achieves a positive (negative) value: the higher (lower), the better (worse). From a cooperative perspective, however, the effective negotiator achieves a score close to 0, indicating a balanced result.

Each of these measures had the potential to broaden understanding of individual effectiveness. With the lone exception of partner-compared, they were all based on standards independent of observed or actual performance, so they could apply to any sample of negotiators and remain intact whether the sample consisted of high, low or mediocre performers.

For dyad effectiveness, which is not an emphasis here but needed for H2 and common practice to report, I selected four measures. (See again Table 1) The first replicates the overall effectiveness standard for individuals: for dyads, the theoretical maximum is 52,200 points. The remaining variables, all dichotomous, were respectively based




Fig. 2 Possible Pareto optimal outcomes ($n = 45$) and joint totals

on achieving (or not) high-level performance, maximum joint value, and Pareto optimality (Teich et al. 2000). In the BB-PTA negotiation, there are 45 unique Pareto pairs of scores (see Fig. 2) that can be reached via 93 eight-item agreements.

Negotiator decisions. In addition to individual participants' point earnings, the data sets contain the substantive solution agreed upon for each of the eight agenda items. As Raiffa et al. (2002, 84ff) have written, such results may be studied from individual, interactive, and joint decision-making perspectives. So an agreed solution may be viewed not only as a joint decision, but also as two individual decisions. Ikle (1976, 59ff) has stated that every negotiator has a "continual threefold choice": to accept present terms, reject them, or pursue further bargaining.

In this spirit, I used several variables for negotiators' decisions. One variable describes an agreed solution or decision on an agenda item in terms of its level of benefit to a negotiator. I chose this approach because it: (a) represents a vantage point or frame that negotiators can assume on every agenda item (e.g., "my best" solution, "my worst" solution); (b) offers a characterization of different types of decisions (cf. Filzmoser and Vetschera 2008); and (c) provides a common scale that facilitates factor analysis and comparison of decisions across agenda items *and* negotiator roles. For every item, the agreed-upon solution was recoded from 1 (least beneficial) to 5 (most beneficial) depending on the negotiator's role. A "3" indicated middle-solution compromise whereas "5" stood for maximum value-claiming or assertiveness and "1" for total concession.⁴ The "2" and "4" codes could be construed as "nudges" involving either minor concession or soft value-claiming.

⁴ This compromise is *not* equivalent to 50% of the joint value of any of the five conflict issues except for renewals. Then again, a BB-PTA negotiator does not know that.

In addition, decisions were evaluated in ways specific to the type of agenda item. On the reverse-priority items, decisions were coded two ways. The first, a simple dichotomy, recorded whether or not maximum logrolling occurred; the second registered the integrativeness of decisions on the two items. Following Pinkley et al. (1994, 106), this scale ranged from 0 to 4. On no-conflict items, decisions were also coded twice. The first procedure recorded only whether or not a negotiator agreed to all three maximal settlements, and the second identified the specific number of maximal settlements.

4 Results

In addition to separate databases for 1,060 individuals and 530 dyads, a third database was created for most analyses of individual negotiators. Since observations in the first database are not independent, I adopted the procedure in Pinkley et al. (1994, 108) and randomly selected one individual from each dyad for the third database. It is hereafter referred to as the “random set.”⁵

4.1 Negotiator Effectiveness

Table 2 summarizes central tendencies in the random set for all measures of individual and dyadic effectiveness. Distributions for the continuous individual variables met generally accepted criteria for normality.⁶ These data were used “as is” for descriptive and inferential statistics whereas dyads’ overall effectiveness, to which we will return, required special treatment (See Fig. 3a, b).

With respect to H1, the top of Table 2 shows that individuals’ mean overall effectiveness in the random set was 76. No one achieved a perfect score of 100. With respect to high-level performance (90 score), 515 (97%) of the 530 negotiators fell short. On the benchmarked standard, negotiators also tended not to be effective, although average performance was just below the benchmark (−3%). This result is more pronounced when viewed by frequency: 63% of the 530 negotiators were below the line, and 20%—105 individuals—missed by at least 10%.⁷

The effectiveness—or ineffectiveness—of the BB-PTA negotiators is less easily discerned with the remaining individual performance criteria in Table 2. Negotiators tended to achieve almost 50 on value-adding effectiveness, which appears reasonable, but the measure carries no intrinsic threshold for delineating negotiators. Moreover, performance varied widely. Three negotiators’ value-adding effectiveness was less than 0 (see Table 2); they did not even reach the easy-money baseline.

⁵ To validate its representativeness, I tested its means for several variables against those for excluded individuals and found no significant differences ($p < .01$).

⁶ The significance of the Shapiro–Wilk statistics notwithstanding, other considerations recommended by Meyers et al. (2006, 68) and others justify the treatment of the data as a normal distribution: high correlations between the data and perfect normality ($r = .97$ – $.98$), low skewness and kurtosis, satisfactory Q–Q plots, and legitimate outliers.

⁷ Mindful of margins of error, I looked at performance by multiple bands (e.g., < -10 , -10 to $+10$, > 10) as well as single-point thresholds.

Table 2 Observed effectiveness of negotiators in random set (by unit of analysis and measure)

Effectiveness	Individuals ($n = 530$)				Dyads ($n = 530$)	
	Overall	Benchmarked	Value-adding	Partner-compared	Overall	
Mean	76.2	-3.2	49.4	-0.7	95.2	
SD	6.9	9.4	15.7	21.9	4.2	
Min	47.1	-41.4	-19.4	-65.1	73.2	
Max	96.6	25.1	93.3	68.2	100.0	
Mode	[38]_80	[40]_0	[27]_50	[48]_0	[75]_95.0	
S-W stat	.98*	.98*	.97*	.98*	.71*	
Role diff (t value)	-5.00*	-10.05*	-10.24*	-11.61*	n.a.	

Effectiveness	High-level performers ($n = 15$)				Performers	
	Overall	Benchmarked	Value-adding	Partner-compared	High ($n = 488$) Overall	Low ($n = 42$) Overall
Mean	92.1	18.9	84.2	54.0	96.3	83.1
SD	2.2	2.9	4.3	9.1	1.9	4.5
Min	89.8	16.1	79.9	40.1	89.8	73.2
Max	96.6	25.1	93.3	68.2	100.0	89.5
Mode	[6]_90	[5]_16	[4]_80	[2]_46,55,68	[75]_95	[6]_88
S-W stat	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	.99*	.94

* $p < .01$ [] indicate frequency


S-W Shapiro-Wilk (SPSS 16)

Role diff: independent samples t -test of means

On partner-compared effectiveness, BB-PTA negotiators generally obtained about as high a proportion of value as their partners did on conflict agenda items ($M = -0.7$). Thus, from a cooperative or balanced perspective, the negotiators appear effective rather than ineffective. On the other hand, they were not effective when evaluated from a competitive perspective that values dominance. Once again, however, performance varied considerably.

Two other results for individual performance deserve mention. First, beyond the average and majority performances, some individuals were remarkably effective. For example, 15 negotiators met the high-level standard (bottom of Table 2). Other very effective individuals may be found near the maxima of other measures. Second, PTAs surprisingly outnumbered BBs (14 out of 15) in the high performer group. Analysis of all individual effectiveness measures by role in the random set revealed significant role differences. PTAs typically achieved +.6 on benchmarked effectiveness whereas BBs averaged -7.0 . On partner-compared effectiveness, BBs claimed 11% less value than PTAs did (see t statistics in Table 2). Possible explanations for these differences appear in Sect. 5 below.

Dyadic effectiveness measures shed additional light on these results. In general, dyads performed at much higher levels than individuals did. The dyadic mean for overall effectiveness was 95.2, with a small standard deviation (albeit not in a normal



* one randomly selected from every dyad




Fig. 3 Observed overall effectiveness of individuals and dyads ($n = 530$)

distribution, which is addressed below). (Refer to Table 2; Fig. 3) Further, 15 dyads reached 100—the theoretical maximum. A remarkable 92% of all dyads performed at or above the high-level standard (see bottom of Table 2).

If effectiveness is equated with Pareto optimality, only 4% of the negotiators were effective. Out of 530 dyads, 21—including the 15 joint-maximizers above—crafted Pareto agreements. Of the 21 agreements, 15 were different configurations of eight solutions which led to 9 distinct pairs of scores (cf. Fig. 2). The most frequent pair was equal division of the joint maximum.

Given the limited call for dyadic data in this study, I decided to use dyadic overall effectiveness data with and without transformation. To obtain a normal distribution for the full set of 530 dyads, I carried out a reflect-and-logarithm transformation (cf. Weingart et al. 1993). In order to use the original data without transformation, I split it between high and low performers ($n = 488$, $n = 42$). That produced a normal distribution for the former and viable, if small, distribution for the latter (see S–W stats in Table 2). The low dataset coincides almost perfectly with the 44 dyads identified as extremes in an SPSS EXPLORE analysis of overall effectiveness.⁸

4.2 Influences on Ineffectiveness and Effectiveness

For H2 to H4, I reduced the number of individual effectiveness measures. Although the overall, benchmarked, and value-adding measures offer different views of effectiveness, they were correlated in the random set at .98 or higher ($p < .01$). Since the overall and value-adding measures are rather straightforward and do not delineate between effective and ineffective negotiators, I put them aside to focus on benchmarked effectiveness. I also retained the high-level and partner-compared measures. All three have explicit thresholds for effectiveness, and two also convey degrees of effectiveness and ineffectiveness. The benchmarked and partner-compared measures were correlated at $r(528) = .88$, $p < .01$, but their individualistic and comparative orientations represent fundamentally different and important perspectives on performance.

Total joint value. H2—the relationship between individual effectiveness and total joint value—was put to three tests with different effectiveness measures in the random set. Contingency analysis was conducted on high performer status and creation of maximum joint value. Then in two more finely grained analyses, total joint value was regressed on benchmarked effectiveness and on partner-compared effectiveness.

Contingency analysis showed that for nearly all of the 515 negotiators who were not effective (thus “ineffective”) by the high-level standard, ineffectiveness was indeed related to not creating maximum joint value. For effective negotiators, however, the results were striking. Fourteen of the 15 high performers were *not* involved in creating maximum joint value. The chi-square statistic for this analysis was unreliable because of a low expected cell count, so these relationships were successively tested at thresholds of 85 and 80 (cf. 90) for high-level performance. At 80, the chi-square was significant ($\chi^2(1, N = 530) = 20.33$, $p < .01$). As seen in Table 3, effective,

⁸ The low-performer distribution is bi-modal. The two groups on either side of the median (83.5) have significantly different means of 87.0 and 79.1 ($t(37) = 11.7$, $p < .01$).

Table 3 Relationship between high-level individual performers and maximum joint value (random set)

Individual high-level performer (redefined ^a)	Maximum joint value creation		
	No	Yes	Total
No	377 (73.2%)	3 (20.0%)	380 (71.7%)
Yes	138 (26.8%)	12 (80.0%)	150 (28.3%)
Total	515 (100.0%)	15 (100.0%)	530 (100.0%)

^a Overall effectiveness ≥ 80

All percentages within maximum joint value creation

high-performing individuals who were not involved in maximum joint value creation outnumbered those who were by a factor of 12.

In the regressions, total joint value, represented by the transformed dyadic overall effectiveness variable, explained 21% (adj r^2) of individuals' benchmarked effectiveness ($F(1, 528) = 138.47, p < .01$). This relationship was strongly influenced, however, by low-performer dyads. In separate regressions for low and high-performer dyads (run with the untransformed variable), joint value explained 26% of the benchmarked effectiveness of individuals in low-performer dyads ($F(1, 40) = 15.42, p < .01$) but only 7% for those in high-performer dyads ($F(1, 486) = 36.25, p < .01$). Most negotiators—over 90% of the sample—belong to high-performer dyads. With respect to individuals' partner-compared effectiveness, total joint value had no significant effect in regressions based on either transformed or original states of dyadic overall effectiveness.

Logrolling and integrativeness. Only 16% of all dyads logrolled to the maximum extent on the two reverse-priority agenda items. In terms of the Pinkley et al. (1994) scale, about 39% of the BB-PTA negotiators made decisions containing no integrativeness whatsoever, while 21% made it halfway up the scale. The effect of these logrolling decisions was, like the creation of total joint value, examined three ways.

As predicted for ineffective negotiators in H3, the vast majority of non-high-performers did not logroll completely. Yet high performers did not logroll completely either. As with H2, low expected cell values in the crosstabs prompted the lowering of the high-performance threshold to 80, where differences between cells gained statistical significance ($\chi^2(1, N = 530) = 56.19, p < .01$). The relationship between ineffectiveness and not logrolling held, but more effective negotiators chose *not* to logroll than to logroll by a margin of almost two to one.

In regressions of integrativeness on continuous measures for individuals' effectiveness, effects were small or insignificant. For benchmarked effectiveness, the adj r^2 was .05 ($F(1, 528) = 30.62, p < .01$). With partner-compared effectiveness, integrativeness did not significantly explain any variance.

Differentiated decision-making. For H4, which concerns negotiators' decisions on all agenda items, results include the variety of decisions made, treatment of different types of agenda items, and the effects of decisions on individual negotiators' effectiveness. This section reports descriptive statistics for the decisions, results of principal

Table 4 Agreed solutions for eight agenda items: frequencies ($n = 530$)

Agenda Item		Solution*					Total (%)
		a	b	c	d	e	
1	Royalties	3.0	9.8	50.0	26.0	11.1	100
2	Bonus	6.6	20.4	43.0	22.8	7.2	100
3	In press	0.8	1.1	3.2	10.9	84.0	100
4	Promotion	4.5	14.3	27.5	24.5	29.1	100
5	Duration	38.9	23.0	27.0	7.5	3.6	100
6	Renewal	14.0	27.9	42.5	14.9	0.8	100
7	Countries	0.4	0.8	3.4	5.5	90.0	100
8	Book clubs	0.2	0.2	3.6	2.6	93.4	100

*Relabeled and reversed from the descending numerical order of all solutions on role score sheets
 Ex: Item 1, a = 5%, e = 15%

components analysis, and regressions of decisions on negotiators' benchmarked and partner-compared effectiveness.

Table 4 presents an overview of solutions agreed upon for each item on the BB-PTA agenda. Compromise ("c" in the table) occurred frequently on Items 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. This middle solution even attracted some dyads on Items 3, 7 and 8. At the same time, only 4% of all dyads chose this compromise for all five conflict items, and only 2 dyads out of 530 chose it for all eight agenda items.⁹

The nature of other decisions from an individual's perspective is difficult to see until one turns to Table 5, which identifies decisions by their level of benefit to the negotiator. On Item 1, about 8% of the BB-PTA negotiators maximized their own benefit (Decision 5 in the table). The benefit level of a solution depends on a negotiator's role, however, so Table 5 breaks this number out for BB and PTA (see the bottom row for each agenda item). (Bear in mind that the random set excludes partner data.) On Item 1, maximum value-claiming was three times more frequent among PTAs than BBs (12% versus 4%). This decision was made most frequently on Items 3, 7 and 8, but these are special cases where negotiators' maxima coincided with their partners'. Total concessions (Decision 1) occurred most often on Item 5 with BBs. Minor concessions and soft value-claiming decisions (Decisions 2 and 4) occurred more often than extreme decisions (1 and 5) on all items except Item 5 and predictably, Items 3, 7 and 8.

With respect to negotiators' treatment of agenda item types, qualitative differences are depicted in Fig. 4. Pure conflict items were most frequently settled by compromise—the middle solution (see Fig. 4a). In fact, 13% of the 530 dyads chose it for all three issues. At the same time, its frequency declined across the three issues (see Table 4). For reverse-priority items, the most common decision was not to logroll completely (recall results for H3). Ten percent of all dyads agreed on the middle solution for both items. Negotiators' treatment of these items varied considerably, however

⁹ This is reassuring since a high frequency of "mid's" all the way down could indicate that participants did not take the exercise seriously.

Table 5 Individuals' decisions and benefits on eight agenda items: frequencies (random set, $n = 530$)

Agenda		Decision ^a					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
1	Royalties	6.4	18.9	50.0	17.0	7.7	100%
	(BB, PTA)	10.5, 2.3	28.9, 8.7	45.9, 54.2	10.9, 23.1	3.8, 11.7	100,100
2	Bonus	7.5	22.6	43.0	20.6	6.2	100%
	(BB, PTA)	8.6, 6.4	23.3, 22.0	42.5, 43.6	18.8, 22.3	6.8, 5.7	100,100
3	In press	0.8	1.1	3.2	10.9	84.0	100%
4	Promotion	16.6	17.9	27.5	20.9	17.0	100%
	(BB, PTA)	3.0, 30.3	13.5, 22.3	28.9, 26.1	26.7, 15.2	27.8, 6.1	100,100
5	Duration	22.8	17.0	27.0	13.6	19.6	100%
	(BB, PTA)	41.0, 4.5	24.4, 9.5	26.3, 27.7	5.6, 21.6	2.6, 36.7	100,100
6	Renewal	7.2	22.3	42.5	20.6	7.5	100%
	(BB, PTA)	13.5, 0.8	28.2, 16.3	44.0, 40.9	13.5, 27.7	0.8, 14.4	100,100
7	Countries	0.4	0.8	3.4	5.5	90.0	100%
8	Book clubs	0.2	0.2	3.6	2.6	93.4	100%

^a Labeled in terms of benefit to the negotiator: 1 = least; 5 = most

$n_{BB} = 266$, $n_{PTA} = 264$ from different dyads

BB and PTA frequencies are identical for no-conflict items

(see Fig. 4b). Lastly, on no-conflict items, negotiators chose the same solution more than they did on any other item type (see Fig. 4c): maximum gain for themselves (and, as it turned out, their counterparts). The frequency of this decision increased across the three no-conflict items. Ultimately, 80% of all negotiators reached this conclusion on every one of the no-conflict items while, on the other extreme, nearly 5% did not reach it on any of the three.

To determine whether or not decisions on item types could be grouped on a statistical basis, I carried out principal components analysis of negotiators' decisions (coded by benefit level) on the five conflict items (see the correlation matrix in Table 6). No-conflict items were omitted because their distributions were highly skewed and resisted transformation by typical methods. Two components were extracted that explained 52.95% of the variance: on the first, reverse-priority items loaded most heavily, and the second consisted of the two pure conflict items with zero-sum point totals.¹⁰ (See Table 7.) Renewal, the "pure" conflict item with nonzero-sum payoffs, loaded on the first component rather than the second, but not as highly on the first as the two reverse-priority items. (For more on this, see Sect. 5.)

To test H4, I put the two components in regression models for benchmarked and partner-compared effectiveness. To incorporate decisions on no-conflict items, I followed a previously published procedure for dealing with severely non-normal distributions (Bikker and Thompson 2006, 1675) and created a dummy variable for whether or

¹⁰ If one sets aside the normality requirement and analyzes decisions on all eight items, three components emerge. The third groups the three no-conflict items.

Fig. 4 Observed solutions for different agenda items ($n = 530$)




Table 6 Correlations between negotiators' decisions on conflict items (random set)

Decision ^a on	Royalties	Bonus	Promotion	Duration	Renewal	
Royalties	1.000	.024	-.048	.283*	.031	Pearson Corr
		.579	.270	.000	.473	Sig. (2-tailed)
	530	530	530	530	530	N
Bonus	.024	1.000	.082	.007	-.004	Pearson Corr
			.058	.864	.923	Sig. (2-tailed)
	530	530	530	530	530	N
Promotion	-.048	.082	1.000	-.316*	-.160*	Pearson Corr
		.058		.000	.000	Sig. (2-tailed)
	530	530	530	530	530	N
Duration	.283*	.007	-.316*	1.000	.260*	Pearson Corr
		.864	.000		.000	Sig. (2-tailed)
	530	530	530	530	530	N
Renewal	.031	-.004	-.160*	.260*	1.000	Pearson Corr
		.923	.000	.000		Sig. (2-tailed)
	530	530	530	530	530	N

^a In terms of benefit to the negotiator

* $p \leq .01$

Table 7 Factor loadings from principal components analysis of decisions on conflict items ($n = 530$)

Items in boldface indicate the items included in that component

	Integrative	Distributive
Royalties	.47	.56
Bonus	-.06	.76
Promotion	-. .63	.36
Duration	.81	.13
Renewal	.56	-.16

not maximal solutions were chosen for all three agenda items. Given role differences reported earlier, I also included a dummy variable for role. Regression results for the random set appear in Table 8. Each model explains approximately 70% of negotiator effectiveness ($F(4, 525) = 286.85$ and 333.80 , $p < .01$), with the distributive component providing the most explanatory power of the three sets of decisions. Role did not significantly affect either measure of effectiveness.

5 Discussion

5.1 Negotiator Effectiveness

On the question of individual performance in mixed-agenda negotiations, H1 predicted that individuals tend not to be effective. Of the five main measures used on the BB-PTA data, the three with explicit thresholds for effectiveness—high-level, benchmarked,

Table 8 Results of multiple regression models of decisions on negotiator effectiveness ($n = 530$)

Predictor	Benchmarked effectiveness				Partner-compared effectiveness			
	<i>B</i>	SE	β	<i>sr</i>	<i>B</i>	SE	β	<i>sr</i>
Role	-.77	.67	.04	-.03	-0.01	1.48	.00	.00
Integrative factor	2.62	.32	.28**	.20	8.04	0.71	.37**	.26
Distributive factor	6.20	.25	.66**	.62	16.68	0.55	.76**	.71
No-conflict	8.03	.58	.34**	.34	1.29	1.28	.02	.02
Constant	-9.21	.61			-1.75	1.35		
R^2	.69				.72			
Adj R^2	.68				.72			

Role: 0 = BB, 1 = PTA

No-conflict: 0 = 2 or fewer max solutions, 1 = 3 max solutions

sr: semi-partial correlation

Significance of corresponding *t* values: ** $p < .001$

and partner-compared (competitive view)—offered supporting evidence. Only the cooperative interpretation of the partner-compared measure suggested effectiveness. But there are other noteworthy dimensions to these performance data.

Overall effectiveness, the most easily calculated performance indicator, turned out to be rather unhelpful in identifying effectiveness and ineffectiveness. The measure carried no a priori threshold for effectiveness other than a perfect 100. The observed mean of 76 was one alternative, although there was no basis for assuming that average performance in this database represented effective negotiation. This point holds even if results from another BB-PTA study (Fulmer et al. 2008) are comparable ($M = 78$).¹¹ Trying to legitimize a particular percentage threshold by referring to other negotiation games, as done in the literature review above, can also be problematic. The analysis of the BB-PTA payoff structure and development of different effectiveness measures showed that some portions of the overall range can be taken practically for granted. Recall, for example, the “easy-money” baselines for BB and PTA. This casts the 100-point index in a different light and raises doubts about the validity of simple comparisons of overall effectiveness across negotiation tasks, roles, and situations. (For more on this topic, see Differentiated Decision-Making below.)

As for the extent of ineffectiveness observed on other performance measures, H2 and H3 offer two explanations. They are discussed in the next section. Here, let us take up two other possibilities: one general, and one specific to BBs.

In general, one could contend that the thresholds for effectiveness, which rest on external and theoretical criteria, were too high in practice. Less than 3% of all negotiators achieved high-level performance. That was the highest threshold, however. The best-practices benchmarks for BB and PTA, which also were not met, were 10 and 13 points lower than the high-level criterion of 90. Beyond the question of specific levels, though, this contention reintroduces a broader consideration (which cannot be

¹¹ A second, eight-item BB-PTA study, Ma (2007), did not report negotiators' scores. The only other published work on BB-PTA, Sullivan et al. (2006), used a reduced, five-item agenda.

pursued here): the degree to which performance evaluation should factor in normal negotiator capability and probabilities of outcomes.

With respect to BB negotiators' "ineffectiveness" relative to PTAs, role differences have been reported in many other studies (e.g., [Filzmoser and Vetschera 2008](#), 437; [Gillespie et al. 2000](#); [Kamins et al. 1998](#); [Wolfe and McGinn 2005](#)), so this result is not unique to BB-PTA. Nonetheless, there are explanations specific to the BB-PTA payoff structure. Although each role has the same point maximum, the three pure conflict items account for 52% of PTA's maximum but 43% of BB's. Even if the negotiators select middle solutions for Items 1 and 2, PTA obtains more points than BB. Other solutions on these items produce even wider point gaps for PTA. If PTA takes the initiative to lock this value in early, BB has a difficult time catching up via other agenda items. Alternatively, if BB pursues his or her most valuable item (Item 8) ardently at the outset, PTA may make BB pay for this solution (even if it is no-conflict) with PTA-preferred solutions on conflict items (see [O'Connor and Carnevale 1997](#)). Among the high-performer PTAs in the random set, two-thirds obtained their maxima on Items 1 and 5 and their second best or maximum benefits on Items 2 and 6. These point differences appear to be even larger than the role adjustments built into the benchmarked and partner-compared effectiveness measures.

On the whole, negotiators performed much more effectively as dyads than as individuals. High-level performance was reached by 92% of all dyads versus 3% of the random-set individuals. On overall effectiveness, dyads averaged 95 to individuals' 76. In a New Recruit experiment, [Wolfe and McGinn \(2005\)](#) obtained an even larger spread: 91 versus 57. It appears easier to create joint value than to claim individual gain.

In the BB-PTA exercise, there is a strong incentive always to reach agreement. There is no stated alternative to agreement, and every agreement on a solution—with only 2 exceptions—adds points to a dyad's deal value. But points for most solutions are not allocated equally to the individual negotiators, and each negotiator is simultaneously trying to maximize his or her share, which, on most agenda items, limits the counterpart's gain. Furthermore, individual scores are capped if a dyad excels. When dyadic overall effectiveness is 100, PTA can at most reach 99 on individual effectiveness while BB obtains 62, or BB can reach 86 while PTA obtains 74. (For a discussion of Pareto optimality, see Sect. 5.2.)

Two more dimensions of individual performance deserve to be highlighted. First, BB-PTA data display a wide range in negotiator effectiveness and ineffectiveness. With continuous measures, there is more to the story than told merely by means and modes, although we do not have more space for it here. The variation stems from the large number of possible eight-item agreements (390,625) and variety of skills in a pool of 1,060 individuals.

Second and finally, against the general backdrop of typically ineffective performance, there were outstanding individual negotiators. High performers tended to achieve nearly 20% more than the benchmark and 54% more value than their counterparts on the partner-compared measure (competitive view). (See the bottom half of Table 2.) While extraordinary, these results matter because they can bolster explanations for ineffectiveness and generate insights for improving effectiveness.

5.2 Influences on Ineffectiveness and Effectiveness

Total joint value. H2 received partial yet consistent support across both representations of joint value (achievement of maximum value, and amount of value created). The relationship between individual effectiveness and joint value was significant for the ineffective and the worst-performing negotiators. It did not hold for high performers and explained little variation in benchmarked effectiveness for the vast majority (92%) of negotiators. Joint value had no significant effect on partner-compared effectiveness.

The results for the poor performers align with the prevailing explanation for ineffectiveness in the literature: the smaller the total value, the smaller the portions available to each negotiator. This relationship was most evident among the negotiators belonging to the 42 low-performer dyads. None of them agreed to maximum logrolling on reverse-priority items, and most of them (60%) did not agree on *any* maximal solutions for no-conflict items. The decisions on no-conflict items alone deprived them of 4,500–18,000 points out of the 52,200 maximum for dyads.

The maximum joint value can be attained via 25 configurations of solutions for the eight agenda items. Six solutions are constant: the highest point solutions on no-conflict items (Items 3, 7, and 8), maximum logrolling on the reverse-priority items (4 and 5), and PTA's most favorable solution on Item 6. Differences between the configurations stem from the 25 possible combinations of solutions for pure conflict Items 1 and 2.

Among effective negotiators, more high-performer individuals did *not* maximize joint value than did. How could this be when current literature places so much emphasis on expanding the pie?

One possible reason is that high performers and their counterparts reached Pareto optimal outcomes. Thus they could not have increased joint value to the theoretical maximum without hurting the high performer. This was not the case, however. Only 13% of the high performers at the 90 level of effectiveness, and 11% of the larger number at the reduced level of 80, were members of dyads with Pareto optimal scores. (For more on the relationship between total joint gain and Pareto optimality, see Fig. 2.¹²)

An alternative explanation centers on high performers' sheer assertiveness, the submissiveness of their counterparts, and role advantages. Remember that 14 of the 15 original high performers (and most of the 150 at the 80 level) were PTAs who obtained their most beneficial or second most beneficial solution on several conflict items.

Looking at the continuous variable for joint value leads to another possible explanation. The average overall effectiveness of the dyads to which the 15 individual high performers belonged was 96.8. Once they got there, opportunities to create more joint value may have been difficult to locate, and they probably did not know about the post-settlement settlement technique (Raiffa 1985). At that level as well, additional

¹² Tripp and Sondak (1992) have asserted that typically, more Pareto optimal outcomes exist than maximum joint value outcomes. On the other hand, the frequency of Pareto outcomes observed in my data was much lower than in other studies (49% in Filzmoser and Vetschera (2008, 431), and 32 or 58%, depending on the group, in Weingart et al. (1993)).

factors such as risk aversion, intangible goals, and fatigue may have kept negotiators from pushing to the maximum joint gain.

Similar considerations suggest explanations for the relatively minor effect (7%) of total value on most negotiators' benchmarked effectiveness. As members of high-performer dyads, they found, on average, all but 4% of the maximum joint value. Finally, the lack of a significant effect on partner-compared effectiveness may have to do with the measure itself. While two negotiators' individual shares and effectiveness ratios could vary widely, the maximum joint value of the five conflict items was only 47% of the maximum total (eight-item) value, and the former could, given the payoff structure, only vary within a narrow range (5,200 points). The potential influence of PTA's having a greater pool of points on these items than BB does was also reduced in this measure by the use of ratios rather than absolute amounts.

Logrolling and integrativeness. The low frequency of maximum logrolling by BB and PTA negotiators is less than half that reported in other studies (e.g., [Murnighan et al. 1999](#); [Weingart et al. 1996](#)). As in those studies, BB and PTA negotiators may have considered agenda items sequentially and chosen not to disclose or pursue the comparative information necessary to uncover reverse priorities. Other possible explanations have to do with incentives and rewards in the BB-PTA payoff structure.

The relationship between maximum logrolling and effectiveness in H3 was, like that in H2, supported for non-high performer individuals but not for high performers. Somewhat similarly, [Northcraft et al. \(1994\)](#) found, in a market simulation, that mean individual profit across multiple deals was not significantly related to the percentage of deals that fully integrated negotiators' needs (except among trained negotiators). In addition to explanations offered for H2 results, two other explanations are plausible here. First and perhaps most obviously, decisions on only two agenda items were used to explain performance scores based on all eight. More poignantly, the solutions for the reverse-priority items offer negotiators the least value of any items on the agenda. Maximum logrolling on the two items yields only 8 and 10%, respectively, of PTA and BB's maximum point totals. Individuals may not have paid as much attention to them or pressed for them as hard as they did for other items. Second, even if individuals became aware of integrative potential, high performers' decisions remind us that logrolling does not produce the best individual result here. Logrolling is superior to down-the-middle compromise but not to securing one's most beneficial solution on the high-priority item and any solution better than the worst on the low-priority item.

The minor effect of integrativeness on benchmarked effectiveness is understandable for similar reasons. The difference in points for negotiators from one level of integrativeness to the next is small. A fully integrative agreement on the two reverse-priority items, when compared to compromise (no integrativeness), adds 800 points to each negotiator's score. This equates to only 3% of BB's benchmark, and 3% of PTA's. While this is exactly the shortfall by which negotiators tended to miss their benchmarks, portions of these percentages were available through partial integration (which negotiators may have considered "good enough"). Even more tellingly, much higher values are available elsewhere on the agenda.

With respect to partner-compared effectiveness, integrativeness probably had no significant influence because as the reverse-priority payoffs are structured, no integrativeness and full integrativeness both result in the same, small point spread between

the negotiators (500 more points for BB than for PTA). As percentages of the roles' respective point maxima for conflict items, these amounts become slightly different but remain very small. They must be too small to explain variation in this effectiveness measure.

Combined with H2 results, H3 results put in question the validity of blanket generalizations about the high impact of integrative bargaining. By probing the payoff structure of the New Recruit game on which many conclusions have been based, one can see that reverse-priority items are worth 73% of an individual's maximum score—far more than the 9 and 11% in BB-PTA. Logrolling in such a context is bound to be more influential. The BB-PTA results demonstrate that the influence of integrative bargaining may vary by performance criterion *and* by negotiation agenda or situation.

Differentiated decision-making. Finally, H4 was supported. In general, BB-PTA negotiators selected different forms of solutions for different types of agenda items, and decisions on different item types significantly explained most of the variation in benchmarked and partner-compared effectiveness. Negotiators' decision-making seemed to evolve over items of the same type, and the magnitude of influence of these decisions differed in unanticipated ways. Let us take up the decisions themselves first then turn to their impact on effectiveness.

Negotiators in the random set most often chose compromise—the middle-listed solution—on issues of pure conflict. This is not surprising given the common propensity to compromise (Murnighan et al. 1999) and concern about fairness through distributive justice (cf. Humphrey et al. 2004). The negotiators did not treat reverse-priority items the same way they treated conflict issues. While they evidently realized that these items differed from others on the agenda, they seemed unclear about how to handle them. Three different solutions for each reverse-priority item attracted 23% or more of the negotiators' support. The distribution of solutions selected for each item trended toward maximum logrolling, but as in many other studies, only a minority of negotiators decided to do so fully. Possible explanations have already been advanced in the discussion of H2. In addition, it is conceivable that many negotiators were generally reluctant to demand or consent to extreme solutions.

On no-conflict items, one decision stood out by a larger margin than on any other agenda item. At least 84% of the negotiators decided to maximize their own benefit or, as the case might be, common value. This decision is rational on both individual and collective grounds, but how exactly the BB and PTA negotiators made it lies beyond the reach of these data. As other researchers have pointed out, some negotiators decipher each other's preferences, some engage in mutual disclosure, and still others seek advantage through asymmetric information exchange (Maddux et al. 2008; O'Connor and Carnevale 1997; Thompson et al. 1990a).¹³

What was not anticipated was change in decisions across items within a type. On pure conflict items, for example, the frequency of compromise dropped from 50% to 42.5% from Items 1 to 2 to 6 (refer to Tables 4, 5). From the first to second reverse-priority items, 10% more negotiators accepted the solution preferred by the negotiator who valued the item most. On the no-conflict items, decision frequencies on the

¹³ Some negotiators may even use these agenda items to penalize counterparts for their behavior elsewhere (cf. Diekmann et al. 2003).

maximal, common-value solution increased from 84 to 90 to 93% in the order of the items on the agenda. If items within each type were discussed in this order, these shifts indicate that negotiators learned about the nature of these items and developed more appropriate or creative solutions for them.¹⁴ (See also the changes in [Filzmoser and Vetschera 2008](#).) Negotiators still handled agenda items of different types more differently than they handled items within a type but their within-item decision-making was richer than expected.

The principal components analysis statistically confirmed the differences between negotiators' decisions. In general, their decisions reflected the differences between agenda items built into the BB-PTA task structure. Decisions on pure conflict ("distributive") items largely loaded together, as did decisions on reverse-priority ("integrative") items.

The surprising result here was the low, negative loading of renewal (Item 6) on the distributive component. Although I have treated it as "pure" conflict throughout this article (on the grounds that BB and PTA want different solutions for it and each role's potential losses from one solution to another are high), renewal involves nonzero-sum payoffs. Negotiators themselves could not have known that without seeing counterparts' score sheets. What a PTA negotiator can see, though, is that renewal, along with only one other item, is the highest value on the agenda for PTA and unlike any other item, entails one solution worth 0 points and point differentials between solutions that are the highest on the agenda. (This is also the only pure conflict item that always goes to PTA in configurations that maximize total joint value.) These factors could have compelled PTA negotiators to take more extreme stands on renewal than elsewhere. In addition, if they proceeded through the agenda items as listed and had just dealt with reverse-priority items, PTAs may have perceived renewal to be another high priority item for PTA that could be traded off in toto with another agenda item. Renewal decisions did load on the integrative component positively, like duration, PTA's nominally high-priority item.

With respect to the impact of decisions by item type, all three significantly influenced negotiators' benchmarked effectiveness and explained close to 70% of its variation (see [Table 8](#)). Two of the three types also significantly influenced partner-compared effectiveness. It is not surprising that the third, no-conflict decisions, did not since that measure excludes points earned from no-conflict items.

There were, however, two surprises. The first, given the significant differences in [Table 2](#), was the absence of a significant role effect on both effectiveness measures. Negotiators' decisions clearly mattered more. In effect, this result establishes that the basic relationship between decision-making and effectiveness was similar for BBs and PTAs; it held for individual negotiators regardless of role.

The second, more stunning surprise was the strong influence of the distributive component. In the benchmarked effectiveness model, it outweighed no-conflict and reverse-priority effects by roughly two to one, a magnitude far higher than its proportion of points in BB and PTA payoff tables. The benchmark was based on scores from

¹⁴ Alternatively, item values could have driven shifts in decision-making: the higher the value, the more persistent or careful the negotiators. Among no-conflict items, Item 8 carried the highest value, followed by 7 and then 3.

mere compromise on pure conflict issues, so, *ceteris paribus*, more value-claiming by a negotiator would influence his or her individual effectiveness. Nonetheless, again in this negotiation, the impact of integrative decision-making was not as high as expected from existing literature.

High-performer individuals demonstrated the benefits of distributive decision-making. They appear to have focused on maximum value-claiming decisions on pure conflict and reverse-priority items (as well as no-conflict items), for they tended not to agree to compromise or logrolling solutions. In a sense, they did not display as much differentiated decision-making as other negotiators did. They were a small group. Reaching the high-level standard evidently required assertiveness beyond the capacity of most individuals—and an extraordinarily willing or compliant counterpart. At the same time, along with the benefits, such high-level effectiveness by one individual in a dyad could have negative repercussions (see Sect. 6).

To round out this discussion, consider two portraits of negotiators based on benchmarked effectiveness. Of the 530 random set negotiators, 37% were effective by this measure and 63% were not (hence, “ineffective”). Based on rough but illustrative results from iterations of the regression model in Table 8 for each of these groups, the effective negotiators’ performance was influenced most by decisions on pure conflict items then, to a still high degree, by decisions on reverse-priority items and very little by no-conflict items.¹⁵ The ineffective negotiators’ performance was also influenced most by pure conflict decisions (albeit less than for effective negotiators), but then, to a relatively high degree, by decisions on no-conflict items and very little by reverse-priority items. The impact of more than one kind of decision-making and central role of distributive decision-making come through in both portraits.

6 Implications for Negotiators

In most debriefings of BB-PTA participants, I followed standard practice and recommended integrative bargaining, pointing out the opportunity in the exercise to logroll on Items 4 and 5. Then in one session, a participant inquired, “Is it better to have a big piece of a small pie or a small piece of a big pie?” This takes us to our final question and the last part of the story: how individuals might improve their effectiveness.

In this negotiation, pies and pieces could be measured. In some cases, with a “small” pie of 51,800 points, BB negotiated a piece worth 27,600 points (85 on overall effectiveness) or even 29,200 points (90). In other cases involving a “big” pie worth 52,200 points, BB gained only 26,100 (80). In this set of cases, BB fared better with a smaller pie. (All three results come from Pareto optimal agreements.) Additional evidence that weakens the commonly asserted connection between individual effectiveness and joint value came out in results for H2 (total joint value) and H3 (logrolling). (For contrary data, see Maddux et al. 2008.)

¹⁵ Splitting the random set resulted in two distributions that could not be transformed by the same procedure. The provisional regression results for effective and ineffective negotiators, respectively, were: integrative factor, $\beta = .57$ and $.15$; distributive factor, $\beta = .66$ and $.58$; and no-conflict, $\beta = .13$ and $.49$. The model explained 53 and 54% of the variance in the two subsets’ benchmarked effectiveness ($F(4, 196) = 57.52, p < .01$ and $F(4, 324) = 96.36, p < .01$).

As one looks beyond BB-PTA to mixed-agenda negotiation generally, these findings suggest that contemporary advice to *individual* negotiators overplays the value of integrative decision-making (joint value creation) and underplays the impact of distributive decision-making (individual value-claiming) (Lax and Sebenius 1986). Integrative bargaining certainly has merit. As BB-PTA negotiators demonstrated, it can especially improve the performance of individuals in low joint value dyads. Sound decisions on no-conflict items serve as a case in point. And when negotiators only have a choice on reverse-priority items between compromise or logrolling, logrolling clearly makes sense on individual as well as collective grounds. But there may be other options. BB-PTA negotiators who were effective on both benchmarked and high performance criteria owed their achievements to distributive, value-claiming decisions more than to integrative decisions. The implication for individuals involved in real negotiations comparable to BB-PTA is to pay careful attention to conflict items on the agenda.

To be sure, value-claiming may also be overemphasized. To single out the high-performer individuals in this study as paragons of negotiator decision-making and effectiveness would be to ignore their small number (3% of the total), the presumably exceptional negotiator assertiveness and counterpart acquiescence required, and the imputed low probability of such agreements. At their worst, excessive demands cause animosity, broken relationships, damage to reputations, problems in implementation even if agreement is reached, and a host of other negative, short and long-term consequences.

In most negotiations, however, individuals do not know or discover how far they can push their preferences and still conclude a viable agreement. An answer to this question for the BB-PTA game lies largely outside the data at hand. No BB or PTA negotiator achieved his or her maximum individual total; that was evidently too much for any counterpart (even if 100% for one did not mean 0% for the other). That said, there is a huge zone of possible agreement in BB-PTA. The high performers, in particular, remind us that negotiators cannot learn what is attainable or excel as individuals unless they reach beyond common or easy solutions such as compromises.

In sum, based on these BB-PTA results, individual negotiators who want to be effective in mixed-agenda negotiations should use a combination of decision-making strategies and behaviors. A single approach that suits a simple negotiation is not adequate. At the same time, the best proportions of decision-making forms to use in that combination seem likely to vary rather than remain fixed, even among mixed-agenda negotiations. Advice based on New Recruit-like negotiations does not seem to apply entirely to BB-PTA-like negotiations, and vice versa. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to recommend even now that negotiators formulate and fine-tune their decision-making “combinations” by paying particular attention to performance criteria, agenda items, and benefit structures in their negotiations (cf. Hyder et al. 2000).

7 Limitations and Future Research

This study, like any other, has limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the data consist of negotiators’ final decisions and agreement-outcomes. Without no-agreement outcomes, our picture of negotiator effectiveness is incomplete (Tripp and Sondak 1992). Negotiators’ subjective evaluations of their achievements were also not

available, and they would have been interesting to consider since they typically do not align with objective measures (Galinsky et al. 2002; Naquin 2003, 97; cf. Gillespie et al. 2000). Further, with no information about negotiators' decisions during the negotiations, we could not see how negotiators first approached agenda items or how far they went in value-claiming attempts before accepting final terms.

Second, these negotiations were conducted with one population of negotiators. While the sample is large and displays enough variation to represent individuals of many backgrounds and capabilities, one could certainly ask whether or how the results may be generalized to other populations. The work of other researchers offers grounds for optimism (Fulmer et al. 2008), but a convincing answer here depends on additional empirical work (see also Ma 2007).

Third and lastly, some findings appear to be tied to particulars of the BB-PTA negotiation task, instructions, and reward structure. Other researchers (Clyman and Tripp 2000; Vetschera 2006) have argued that the imposition of goals on role-play participants can interfere with results and conclusions. In addition, as we saw earlier, the BB-PTA payoff structure values some types of agenda items more than others, although unequal weighting per se is fairly realistic and not peculiar to this exercise (cf. New Recruit).

Future research on BB-PTA-like negotiations should address these limitations and deepen our understanding of individual negotiator effectiveness with mixed agendas in several ways. As Clyman and Tripp (2000) have suggested, administration of pre- and post-negotiation questionnaires would provide access to negotiators' personal goals. Data could also be collected on negotiators' initial and in-process perceptions of agenda items, sequencing of items in discussions (e.g., no-conflict items first), communication styles and interactions (e.g., expression of preferences, decision justifications), and development of partial or tentative agreements in the course of negotiation. Work should continue on the conceptualization, underlying values, and measurement of negotiator effectiveness. We need to learn more about how different task structures influence individuals' decision-making and effectiveness in negotiation. These and related concerns should be pursued in deliberate comparisons of mixed-agenda structures and contexts.

8 Conclusion

This study expands our understanding of individual negotiators' effectiveness by building on previous research and exploring new directions. Focusing on negotiation of multiple, mixed agenda-items rather than narrowly defined tasks illuminates more of the scope and limits of negotiator capability and performance.

The BB-PTA data offer answers for the three fundamental questions posed at the outset: how effective are individuals with mixed agendas, why, and how might they improve? Based on multiple criteria and measures, individuals were generally not effective. However, they performed better on some measures than on others, each measure showed how much individual performance can vary, and even on the highest performance standards, there were effective negotiators.

Explanations for individuals' achievements depended to some extent on the measure and level of effectiveness attained. For high-level performance, the non-high

performers were significantly influenced by total joint value and logrolling but high performers were not. For benchmarked performance, total joint value had an effect on all negotiators but it was much stronger on ineffective than on effective negotiators. For partner-compared effectiveness, joint value and logrolling had no effect. Yet differentiated decision-making significantly explained most of the variation in both benchmarked and partner-compared measures.

The most striking results center on the relatively weak influence of integrative bargaining (e.g., expanding the pie, logrolling) and strong impact of distributive decision-making. The impact of decisions on an individual's effectiveness seems to depend on features of the negotiation task—features that differ not just between simple and mixed agendas, but even among mixed agendas (recall BB-PTA and New Recruit). These features include the types of items on an agenda and their value relative to each other and to the entire deal.

Among its contributions to research on mixed-agenda negotiation and negotiation generally, this study has articulated new performance criteria and measures, shown that negotiators address some agenda items more appropriately than others, and adjust their decision-making within an item type over the course of negotiation. The data confirm previous findings such as suboptimal individual performance, low use of logrolling, and differences between individual and joint effectiveness. Perhaps most importantly, this study will encourage more critical examination of the boundaries of integrative decision-making's influence, more investigation of the effects of distributive decision-making in various mixed-agenda contexts, and more intent analysis, in general, of the use and effects of differentiated decision-making.

With regard to practice, and how negotiators might improve their individual effectiveness with mixed agendas, this study suggests that negotiators look for differences among agenda items and prepare to resolve them through a combination of integrative and distributive decision-making and various decisions. The proportions in that combination should not be treated as fixed. Instead, individuals should work them out by type of negotiation, perhaps even case by case, remembering that integrative decisions are not necessarily the most consequential and that distributive, value-claiming decisions have a major impact on individual effectiveness.

In sum, this research highlights the multiple facets of negotiators' decision-making and effectiveness in most real negotiations. As valuable as the emphasis on joint gain has been over the last 25 years, we cannot concentrate on it to the exclusion or neglect of individual gain. The mixture of interests and agenda items and of different forms of negotiator behavior and decision-making originally suggested by [Walton and McKersie \(1965\)](#) still deserve to be at the center of our empirical investigations.

Appendix

See Table 9.

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Table 9 Scoring structure for the BB-PTA negotiation exercise

Agenda item	Term in contract	Points	
		BB	PTA
1. Royalties (pure conflict: zero sum ^a)	15%	1,000	6,000
	13%	2,000	5,000
	10%	3,000	4,000
	7%	4,000	3,000
	5%	5,000	2,000
2. Bonus for signing contract (pure conflict: zero sum)	\$25,000	0	5,000
	20,000	1,000	4,000
	15,000	2,000	3,000
	10,000	3,000	2,000
	5,000	4,000	1,000
3. Book to remain in press (weeks) (no conflict: equal gains)	200	3,500	3,500
	175	3,000	3,000
	150	2,500	2,500
	125	2,000	2,000
	100	1,500	1,500
4. Promotion of book author (weeks) (reverse priorities: BB>PTA)	35	3,000	100
	30	2,500	200
	25	2,000	300
	20	1,500	400
	15	1,000	500
5. Duration of the contract (years) (reverse priorities: PTA>BB)	7	500	500
	6	400	1,000
	5	300	1,500
	4	200	2,000
	3	100	2,500
6. Renewals of contract at publisher's option ("pure" conflict: nonzero sum)	5	5,000	0
	4	4,000	1,500
	3	3,000	3,000
	2	2,000	4,500
	1	1,000	6,000

Table 9 continued

Agenda item	Term in contract	Points	
		BB	PTA
7. Countries in which to sell the book (no conflict: equal gains)	14	4,000	4,000
	12	3,500	3,500
	10	3,000	3,000
	8	2,500	2,500
	6	2,000	2,000
8. Book clubs to adopt the books (no conflict: unequal gains)	5	7,500	5,000
	4	6,000	4,000
	3	4,500	3,000
	2	3,000	2,000
	1	1,500	1,000

^a Order number and item types do not appear in role materials

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